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In Germany, cost-sharing for health care has been used as a financing mechanism since 1923. 
In this article, the historical development of user charges in Germany since the 1980s is 
presented in more detail by type of private expenditure, including direct payments, cost-
sharing measures, and voluntary health insurance. This is followed by a mapping of current 
cost-sharing measures including a discussion of protection mechanisms and responsibility for 
decision-making on cost-sharing measures and a summary of national policy debates. In the 
final section, the results of a systematic review of the literature on the impact of cost-sharing 








Die Selbstbeteiligung des Patienten an den Gesundheitsversorgungskosten hat in Deutschland 
eine lange Tradition und geht auf das Jahr 1923 zurück. In dieser Arbeit wird die historische 
Entwicklung und Bedeutung von Kostenselbstbeteiligung im Gesundheitswesen seit 1980 
detailliert nach Art der Gesundheitsausgaben dargestellt. Dies beinhaltet direkte Zahlungen, 
Kostenbeteiligung, und private Krankenversicherung. Darauf folgt eine Darstellung der 
derzeitigen Regelungen zur Selbstbeteiligung mit Berücksichtigung der verschiedenen 
Mechanismen zum Schutz vor katastrophalen Gesundheitsausgaben und der Zuständigkeit für 
politische und administrative Entscheidungsfindungen zur Selbstbeteiligung. Im letzten 
Abschnitt werden die Ergebnisse einer systematischen Literatursuche zu den Auswirkungen 
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1.  Levels of private expenditure on health care 
 
 
Cost-sharing has a long tradition within the German health care system. In 1923 the first cost-
sharing measure in the form of a 10-20% co-insurance for pharmaceuticals and medical 
appliances was introduced during a period of economic recession into the social health 
insurance (SHI) system, and an exemption mechanism for the unemployed was already put in 
place (Reichelt 1994a). In 1930 this co-insurance was replaced by a flat fee co-payment per 
prescription and an additional co-payment for ambulatory care consultations was introduced 
(Reichsministerium des Innern 1930). These changes were part of a number of emergency 
regulations passed to counteract substantial reductions in sickness fund revenues and 
increases in claims for unemployment benefits during the financial crisis at the end of the 
Weimar republic (Alber 1992).  
 
Since Bismarck’s original legislation from 1883 which already defined a minimum benefits 
catalogue (Bärnighausen & Sauerborn 2002), benefits were gradually expanded, in particular 
during the era of economic growth of the 1950s and 1960s, to become very comprehensive in 
the first half of the 1970s. This is reflected by the rapid growth of health care expenditure in 
the period 1965 to 1975 and a falling ratio between monetary and service/product benefits 
during the same time (Busse 2000). Cost-sharing measures were almost inexistent during this 
period, being limited to a co-payment of DM 1 per prescription for pharmaceuticals (Alber 
1992). The era of rapid expansion of health care expenditure and benefits ended with the 
global oil crisis. The Health Insurance Cost-Containment Act of 1977 started a long series of 
legislation with the primary aim of containing costs (Busse 2000). 
 
Since 1980 private expenditure in the form of out-of-pocket payments and voluntary health 
insurance (VHI) as a percentage of total health expenditure has steadily increased from 15.5% 
in 1980 to 18.7% in 1998, with most of the increase attributable to out-of-pocket payments. 
The share of the latter increased by 36% during this period, whereas the share of VHI only 
increased by 4% (Table 1).  
 
5 Table 1: Main sources of finance (percentage of total expenditure on health care), 1980-1998  
 
Source  of  finance  1980 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 
Public        
    Statutory insurance  66.2  -  64.4  63.7  65.2  67.4 
    Taxes  10.9 - 13.1  12.7  11.1  8.4 
Private 
    Out-of-pocket 



















Sources: New health account data, Federal Statistical Office 2001 (Presseexemplar zur Einführung der neuen 
Gesundheitsausgabenrechnung) 
Notes: 1. Data in all tables and figures up to and including 1990 is for the Federal Republic of Germany only, 
from 1991 onwards data is for the unified Germany including the Länder of the former GDR unless otherwise 
stated. 2. Figures do not add up to 100% due to obmission of “other” sources (mainly employers). 3. “Statutory 




Within the last 25 years successive governments have intervened twelve times to regulate user 
charges and major changes in cost-sharing arrangements are again planned for the next health 
sector reform in 2004 (table 2).  
 
The period covered by table 2 can be summarised by five characteristics: 
 
  User charges started very moderately from a low level; 
  Subsequently, more and more areas were covered, most importantly the inpatient sector 
comprising hospital care, rehabilitative treatment and preventive spa-treatment from 1983 
on; 
  Various forms of user charges got more differentiated and sophisticated over the years 
(price-related and later package-size-related co-payments for pharmaceuticals; different 
levels of user charges for crown and denture treatment in relation to take-up of preventive 
annual check-ups); 
  Reference prices became part of the co-payment regulations in 1989; 
  In 1998 nominal amounts for user charges payable peaked and the trend of expanding 
them was reversed. 
 
The proposals for the health system modernisation act planned to come into force on 1 
January 2004 contain plans for a complete re-structuring of cost-sharing arrangements 
(Deutscher Bundestag 2003). If adopted, these will again result in substantial increases in 
private expenditure. 























Ambulatory medical treatment  0   000000   00000 1 0 0
1  
Pharmaceuticals (€)  0.5  0.8  1               
     - without reference price 
2    1.5 1.5            5-10  (10%)




















5-10 (10% of price 
up to RP)
 2 plus 
100% above RP 
            plus plus plus plus plus plus plus plus  
     - up to € 15 in price 
2           . 5   1        
     - >30 up to € 25 in price            2.6                
      - over € 25 in price            3.6                
     - small pack 
2                 1.5 2.0 4.6 4.6 4.1 4.1 4.0
     - medium pack 
2                2.6 3.1 5.6 5.6 4.6 4.6 4.5
     - large pack 
2                 3.6 4.1 6.6 6.6 5.1 5.1 5.0
Conservative dental treatment  0  0 000000   00000 1 0
1
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sum 

















     - for persons born after 1978    100%  100% 100%  
Orthodontic treatment





















Transportation to and from medical 
facility (€ per trip) 
1.8    2.6 2.6  
     - inpatient treatment or emergencies    10.2 10.2 10.2 10.2 10.2  12.8 12.8 12.8 12.8 13 5-10 (10%) 
     - ambulatory treatment    100% 100% 100% 100% 100%  100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Non-physician care (e.g. home 
nursing, physiotherapy) (€ per 
prescription or % of costs) 
0.5  2 2 10% 10% 10% 10% 10%  15% 15% 15% 15% 15% 10 plus 10%
9
Hospital stay and inpatient 
rehabilitation after a hospital stay (€ 
per day)
 10
0      0 2.6 2.6 5.1 5.6 6.1 6.1 8.7 8.7 8.7 8.7 9 10
Preventive spa or inpatient 
rehabilitation unrelated to hospital 
stay (€ per day) 
0      0 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.6 6.1 12.8 12.8 12.8 12.8 8.7 9 10
Notes:
 1 per physician or dentist consulted per quarter except referrals; 
2 with price of drug as maximum; 
3 from 1982-1988 limited to % of
 technical/laboratory costs; 
4 if insured had regular annual check-ups for the last five years; 
5 if the insured 
had regular annual check-ups for the last ten years; 
6 100% for major dental work (more than four replacement teeth per jaw or more than three per side of mouth, except multiple single bridges, which may exceed three); 
7 and treatment is begun 
under age 18, otherwise 100%; 
8 full cost is reimbursed retrospectively by the sickness fund if a predefined treatment plan is entirely completed; 
9 for home nursing limited to 28 days per year; 
10 1983-2003 limited to a total of 14 days per year, 
from 2004 limited to 28 calendar days per year. Several rates in this table were lower in the Eastern part of Germany until 1999. 
Source: Own compilation based on data from (Alber 1992;Busse 2000;Deutscher Bundestag 2003;Verband der Angestellten-Krankenkassen (VdAK) & Arbeiter-Ersatzkassen-Verband (AEV) 2003a) 
7  
In the following sections, the historical development of user charges in Germany since the 
1980s is presented in more detail by type of private expenditure. Informal payments are not an 
issue in Germany.  
 
 
1.1.     Direct payments  
 
Direct payments for goods or services which are not covered by any form of insurance in 
Germany consist in exclusions of specific services from the SHI benefits catalogue and in the 
form of non-reimbursement of over the counter (OTC) pharmaceuticals. In Germany, some 
OTC drugs are reimbursed by sickness funds if they are prescribed by a physician. 
 
During the 1960s and 70s the benefits covered by SHI became very comprehensive, as 
legislation grants every insured person the right to medical care “necessary to diagnose, cure, 
prevent aggravation of disease or to alleviate symptoms” (§§ 2, 12 SGB V). All benefits 
covered by SHI are listed in the Uniform Value Scale, which represents the fee schedule for 
office-based physicians. The explicit exclusion of ambulatory care medical benefits from SHI 
coverage was not possible until 1997, when a new mandate to evaluate health technologies 
was introduced (Busse 2000). The decisions on which benefits to exclude are made by the 
Federal Committee of Physicians and Sickness Funds. So far the committee has excluded only 
a small number of technologies with limited medical benefit, e.g. osteodensitometry for 
asymptomatic patients. Nevertheless, the committee’s decisions have raised massive protests 
from providers and the public.  
 
Until 1997 exclusion of benefits was thus limited to other sectors. Consequently, certain 
dental services like gold or ceramic inlays, some medical aid devices, death pay for those 
insured after 1989, and pharmaceuticals for so-called “petty diseases” like the common cold 
and travel-related diseases and pharmaceuticals which are either cheap or of unproven 
medical benefit were incrementally excluded from the SHI benefits catalogue (Braun, Kühn, 
& Reiners 1998). 
 
Between 1987 and 2001, OTC sales have continuously grown in real terms. In 1987 price 
terms, OTC sales have risen to 190 in 2001, whereas physician-prescribed OTC drug sales are 
8 at the same level as in 19871(Bundesverband der Arzneimittel-Hersteller (BAH) 2002). In 
2001, pharmacy sales for non-reimbursed OTC totalled 3.9 billion €  and OTC worth 350 
million € were sold outside pharmacies e.g. in drugstores (Bundesverband der Arzneimittel-
Hersteller (BAH) 2002).  
 
On the other hand, OTC spending has decreased both as a share of total pharmaceutical 
spending and in absolute terms between 1997 and 2001, from 18% to 14%, and from €4.6 to 
4.27 billion, respectively. This was mainly caused by a fall in prices for OTC drugs during 
this period, whereas the number of OTC packages sold remained remarkably stable with 
about 680 million packages sold per year (Bundesfachverband der Arzneimittel-Hersteller 
(BAH) 1998a;Bundesverband der Arzneimittel-Hersteller (BAH) 2002). Physician-prescribed 
OTC sales have also decreased from 4 billion € in 1996 to 3 billion € in 2001 (Verband 
Forschender Arzneimittelhersteller e.V. 1998;Verband Forschender Arzneimittelhersteller 
e.V. 2002).   
 
 
1.2.     Cost-sharing  
 
Depending on the type of expenditure, both flat rate co-payments and co-insurance are used in 
the German SHI. The evolution of cost-sharing measures per type of expenditure from 1980 
to 1994 is presented in table 3.   
 
                                                       
1 After transient increases to 120 in 1992 and 1996 (Bundesverband der Arzneimittel-Hersteller (BAH) 2002). 
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Table 3. Proportion and total amount of co-payments and co-insurance payments of SHI-insurees in Germany in 1980, 1992, and 1994 
1.1.1  Area 
West Germany  Germany 
       1980 1992 1994
  2  million €  in % of SHI 
expenditure in 
given area 
3  million €  in % of SHI 
expenditure in 
given area 
4  million €  in % of SHI 
expenditure in 
given area 
Total        1,289  3.1 3,734  3.6 4,708  4.2
Denture              939 20.0 2,385 32.8 2,459 40.6
Pharmaceuticals              329 4.9 673 3.9 1,464 8.9
Hospital              0 0 354 1.1 432 1.1
Non-physician  treatment              20 2.4 207 9.4 225 9.2
Travel  1            0.3 75 5.5 79 4.3
Preventive spa and 
rehabilitation treatment 
0            0 38 2.1 48 2.2




1.2.1.    Pharmaceuticals 
 
Cost-sharing for pharmaceuticals was first introduced in 1923 and has since been around 
without interruption. Between 1923 and 1929 a co-insurance of 10% (in special cases 20%) 
was in place, which was replaced in 1930 by a flat fee co-payment per prescription, 
independent of the number of items prescribed. With variation of the fixed amount this 
regulation was in place until 1969 (Reichelt 1994a). Between 1970 and 1977, the legislators 
opted again for a co-insurance of 20%, this time with a ceiling of DM 2.5 per prescription. In 
1977, this was changed back to a co-payment of DM 1 per drug prescribed (Reichelt 1994a). 
Thereafter, nominal co-payments were increased by small increments until 1989, when 
reference prices were introduced. In Germany, reference prices mean that sickness funds only 
reimburse pharmacies up to a predefined ceiling for reference-priced drugs and the patient 
ending up paying the difference between the reference price and the market price. Currently 
61.4% of SHI prescriptions and 36.8% of pharmaceutical sales fall under the reference price 
scheme (Nink & Schröder 2003). Between 1989 and 1992 for reference-priced drugs no fixed 
fee co-payment had to be paid on top of the price differential. Since 1993 flat-rate co-
payments have to be paid on top of the price differential between the drug bought and the 
reference price. It is noteworthy that because of competition within the reference-price groups 
and the legal obligation for physicians to inform patients on the fact that they are liable for the 
price difference for a reference-priced drug, very few drugs now exceed the reference-price.  
 
The co-payment system for pharmaceuticals was again completely restructured in 1993, when 
the co-payment amount was first linked to the price of the drug sold. From 1994 on it was 
linked to package size (see table 2). This system combining reference pricing plus package-
size-related co-payments still remains in place today. The graded scheme is meant to provide 
an incentive to physicians for prescribing larger package sizes (Ess, Schneeweiss, & Szucs 
2003) with lower average costs per dose resulting in overall cost-savings per patient treated. 
The new co-payment levels also meant that more than 20% of prescribed drugs had to be paid 
entirely by patients (Busse 2000).  
 
Patients’ aggregate expenditure on co-payments for pharmaceuticals have continuously 
increased from € 0.6 billion in 1987 to an all-time high of € 2.7 billion in 1998. The then 
newly elected Social Democratic Party (SPD)/Green coalition government lowered nominal 
11 co-payment rates immediately after the elections.  As a consequence, aggregate co-payments 
for pharmaceuticals decreased to € 2 billion the following year and remained stable at € 1.8 
billion in 2000 and 2001 (Nink & Schröder 2003).  
 
 
1.2.2.    Ambulatory medical care 
 
Although a co-payment for consultations with ambulatory care physicians was one of the 
earliest cost-sharing measures introduced in 1930, cost-sharing for ambulatory medical care 
has completely vanished from the German health policy arena since 1945 (Reichelt 1994a). 
Only in the latest proposals for the 2004 reform, a co-payment of € 10 per consulted physician 




1.2.3.    Hospital care 
 
Cost-sharing for hospital care was introduced in 1983 in the form of a co-payment of € 2.6 per 
day as an inpatient in a hospital or a rehabilitation facility after a hospital stay. A ceiling of a 
maximum payment for 14 days per year was introduced. Since then, nominal amounts have 
been steadily increased over time to € 9 per day in 2003, but the ceiling definition has 
remained unchanged.  
During long periods of time, i.e. between 1983 and 1990 and again between 1997 and 1999 
co-payments for preventive spa and rehabilitation treatments unrelated to a hospital stay were 
markedly higher than the co-payments for hospital stays – by factor 1.5 to 2.  
 
 
1.2.4.    Dental care 
 
Dental care was and still is the sector where SHI patients pay the largest share of out-of-
pocket expenditure with € 2.46 billion user charges just for dentures in 1994 (see Table 4). 
Dentures were the last benefit to be included in the SHI benefits catalogue in 1975 and in 
1977 the first to be subjected to cost-sharing in the form of a 20% co-insurance (Alber 1992). 
Dental care also became an area to test market-oriented cost-containment instruments (Busse 
2000). In the 1989 Health Care Reform Act, cost-sharing was not only advocated to raise 
12 revenue, but also to reward “responsible behaviour” by rewarding good preventive practice 
with lower co-insurance rates (Busse 2000). Thus, co-insurance for crowns and dentures was 
graded depending on the uptake of annual preventive check-ups. If an insured person had 
regular annual dental check-ups for the last 10 years he or she would pay 35% co-insurance, 
40% for 5 years of check-ups, and 50% in case of less regular or no check-ups (see Table 2). 
In 1997, crowns and dentures were removed from the benefits catalogue for everyone born 
after 1978, although the affected insured population was required to pay the same level of 
contributions as everyone else. For people born before 1979 another innovation was 
introduced. For the first time a medical treatment was subjected to direct contracts between 
SHI patients and providers, and patients only received a fixed sum as a reimbursement from 
the sickness fund retrospectively, whereas for the rest of medical care in Germany physicians 
are reimbursed via their corporate bodies by the sickness funds. Despite legal limits for extra 
billing being in place, the Federal Ministry of Health estimated that at least one third of 
dentists overcharged and the regulation was abolished in 1998 accordingly to be replaced by 
the former co-insurance regulation (Busse 2000).  
 
1.2.5.    Other areas: transport and non-physician care 
 
Sickness funds covered costs for transport to and from medical facilities until 1989. This 
included physicians’ offices. In 1977 a flat-rate co-payment of € 1.8 per trip was introduced 
and increased to € 2.6 in 1982. In 1989, more drastic changes were made. Transport to 
ambulatory care physicians was excluded from reimbursement and co-payments for transport 
to other facilities was increased by factor 4 to € 10.2 per trip. This regulation has since 
remained in place with incremental increases in co-payments to reach € 13 per trip in 2003 
(see Table 2).  
 
Non-physician care which has to be prescribed by a SHI-contracted physician to be 
reimbursable was subjected to moderate co-payments between 1977 and 1988. In 1989, a co-
insurance of 10% was introduced which was increased to 15% in 1997 and is still in place.  
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1.3.     Voluntary health insurance 
 
 
Voluntary health insurance (VHI) has two facets in Germany: to fully cover a portion of the 
population and to offer supplementary insurance for SHI insured persons (Busse 2000). 
Between 1975 and 2002, the number of people having full-cover VHI has risen from 4.2 
million to 7.7 million, representing 6.9% and 9.3% of the population respectively (Thomson, 
Busse, & Mossialos 2002b;Verband der Privaten Krankenversicherung (PKV) 2003). The 
VHI insured consist of three main groups: high-earning employees2, the self-employed, and 
civil servants (Thomson, Busse, & Mossialos 2002a). The benefits covered are usually equal 
or better than those offered by SHI, but depend on the package chosen (Busse 2000). Policies 
with high deductibles and/or excluding certain benefits like dental care are mainly bought by 
the self-employed, as for all employees the employers contribute 50% to VHI premiums up to 
a ceiling of € 241.50 per month for the employer contribution in 2003. For civil servants the 
government reimburses 50% to 80% of health care costs directly, and many take out a special 
VHI plan to cover the remainder. Students in higher education and junior physicians3 are also 
allowed to opt out of SHI and buy substitutive VHI, even if their income does not exceed the 
usual threshold (Verband der Privaten Krankenversicherung (PKV) 2003). 
 
The second market for VHI is supplementary insurance to cover extra amenities like one-bed-
rooms in hospitals, treatment by the head-of-department or to cover benefits like crowns and 
dentures with high user charges in the SHI. In 2002, 7.6 million people took out a 
supplementary VHI (Verband der Privaten Krankenversicherung (PKV) 2003). Between 1989 
to 2001 total contributions to VHI increased from € 8.7 billion to € 21.7 billion (Verband der 
Angestellten-Krankenkassen (VdAK) & Arbeiter-Ersatzkassen-Verband (AEV) 2003a). 
 
A survey conducted by the Federal Statistical Office from 1993 clearly showed that VHI 
insured households spend substantially more on out-of-pocket payments than households 
covered by SHI. Whereas SHI-insured households spent € 153, VHI-insured households spent 
€ 394 per capita per year. This was also true for OOP as a percentage of income with on 
average 1.4% of annual net income spent on OOP in SHI-insured households compared to 
2.5% in VHI -insured households (Statistisches Bundesamt 1998b).  
                                                       
2 i.e. those employees with a gross pay exceeding € 3825 per month (Verband der Privaten Krankenversicherung (PKV) 2003). 
3 Ärztinnen/Ärzte im Praktikum 
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2.1.     Goods or services for which cost sharing is required 
 
 
The goods and services for which cost-sharing is currently required in Germany are listed in 
detail in Table 4. With the exception of ambulatory visits to general practitioners or 
specialists, conservative dental care and psychotherapy, almost all areas covered by the SHI 
are currently subject to user charges. Patients in the ‘New Länder’ in the Eastern part of 
Germany paid lower levels for selected user charges until 1999.  
 
 
2.2.     Cost-sharing methods currently applied 
 
 
The dominant forms of user charges, according to the definitions provided by Kutzin (Kutzin 
1999), are co-payment and co-insurance. Co-payments for pharmaceuticals, dressings and 
various aids (hearing aids, eyeglasses, orthopaedic aids) are combined with reference prices or 
fixed contractual price ceilings. The latter vary between the different Bundesländer. 
 
Deductibles, although a common form of user charges in the private insurance sector, have 
never played a significant role in the SHI. Legislation to introduce deductibles came into 
effect on 1 July 1997. Sickness funds were allowed to offer deductibles to their insurees in 
exchange for lower contributions rates (Sing 1997). This legal provision was swiftly 
withdrawn by 1 January 1999 after the 1998 Social-democratic Party/Greens general election 
victory. Since 1 January 2003 however, one sickness fund is allowed to test a similar 
arrangement in a pilot project with a € 300 deductible per year in exchange for a € 240 bonus, 
i.e. an offer through which participants may gain up to € 240 and loose up to € 60 per year 
(Techniker Krankenkasse 2003).  
 
Extra-billing is no longer employed within the SHI scheme. However, if a SHI-insured patient 
chooses to be treated by a head-of-department in hospital or chooses expensive ceramic or 
gold inlays not covered by the SHI benefits catalogue, the SHI will still pay the basic SHI 
15 treatment and the patient will receive an extra bill for the services not covered by SHI from 
the physician or dentist on the basis of a private contract (§§ 28, 30 SGB V).  
 
 




According to Table 4, user charges in Germany are overwhelmingly implemented in the form 
of co-payments with a fixed component. This is the case for pharmaceuticals, travel to and 
from medical facilities, hospital and inpatient rehabilitative treatment and inpatient preventive 
spa treatment. In terms of expenditure, the variable cost sharing methods like co-insurance are 
more important due to the high cost for denture and the high level of user charges (table 3). 
For pharmaceuticals, a mixture of fixed and variable components is used combining flat-rate 
co-payments with variable price differentials for reference-priced medication.  
 
 
2.4.     Proportion of the costs of particular services covered by user 
charges and the total amounts of revenue raised by them 
 
 
Due to a conceptual change in health expenditure accounting (Statistisches Bundesamt 1999) 
no reliable data for the most recent years is available. Data on expenditure reported quarterly 
by the sickness funds to the Ministry of Health does not comprise user charges. Moreover, the 
complicated settings and various forms of exemption make an assessment of the cumulative 
and sectoral effects of user charges more difficult (Schneider et al. 1998). The data presented 
in table 4 presents the amount of user charges for three years calculated according to the new 
health accounts model. 
 
Preliminary, unpublished estimates by the Federal Statistical Office for the total amount of 
user charges in the SHI for 2001 are in the order of € 9.9 billion, i.e. around 8% of 
expenditure (Gerlinger 2003).  
 
16 Table 4. Current cost sharing arrangements in Germany (2003) 
 
Good or service  Type of cost sharing  Value in € / %  Protection mechanisms 
Prescription drugs  Co-payment (per prescribed 
item) 
€4 (small pack)  
€4.5 (medium pack) 
€5 (large pack) 
with price of drug as maximum for all package sizes 
plus 100% above reference price for reference-priced drugs 
  Exemptions for children and adolescents 
  Exemptions for social reasons 
  General ceilings to prevent undue burden 
Dressings   Co-payment (per prescribed 
item) 
€4    Exemptions for children and adolescents 
  Exemptions for social reasons 
  General ceilings to prevent undue burden 
Inpatient  hospital stay  Co-payment (per day)  €9    Exemptions for children and adolescents only 
  Ceiling of 14 hospital days/year = €126/year per person 
Inpatient stay in 
rehabilitation facility or 
preventive spa 
Co-payment (per day)  €9    Exemptions for children and adolescents 
  Exemptions for social reasons 
  Only for rehabilitation treatment after a hospital stay: 
  Ceiling of 14 inpatient days in rehab facility/year = €126/year per person 
Transportation  Co-payment (per trip)  Inpatient or emergency care: €13 
 
  Exemptions for social reasons 
  General ceilings to prevent undue burden 
Transportation    Co-insurance Ambulatory care: 100%  No exemptions or ceilings 
Dental care  Co-insurance (rates vary by 
type of treatment and 
dependent on regular 
preventive care) 
  Orthodontic treatment:  20% if eating, speaking or breathing is severely impaired, 
otherwise 100%. Co-insurance is reimbursed to the patient if a predefined treatment plan 
is entirely completed as certified by the dentist 
  Crowns and dentures:  
-  35%  if the insured had annual check ups for the last 10 years 
-  40% if the insured had annual check ups for the last 5 years 
-  50% default rate 
- 100% for major dental work defined as replacement of >4 teeth per jaw or >3 per side 
of mouth, except multiple single bridges which may exceed 3 teeth 
  Exemptions for social reasons 
  General ceilings to prevent undue burden 
  For orthodontic treatment in families with more than one child in need of 
treatment at the same time, the co-insurance rate is reduced to 10% for 
subsequent children (§ 29, SGB V). 
 
Non-physician care  Co-insurance (per medical 
prescription) 
15%    Exemptions for children and adolescents 
  Exemptions for social reasons 
  General ceilings to prevent undue burden 
Appliances (e.g. 
elasticated hosiery) 
Co-insurance (per item)  20%    Exemptions for children and adolescents 
  Exemptions for social reasons 
Prescription drugs  Reference pricing (per item 
prescribed) 
100% above reference price plus flat-rate co-payments (s. above)   
Hearing aids and 
eyeglasses 
Reference pricing  100% above reference prices, which vary between Bundesländer  SHI reimburses full cost of a hearing aid priced above the reference price if it leads 
to a documented improvement of >10% in sensory function compared to two 
reference-priced aids tested on the patient (Hepp 2003) 
Ambulatory physician care  Out-of-pocket maximum  Optional contract offered by one sickness fund: a bonus of €240 per year is offered in case of 
no-consultation during that year in exchange for accepting an out-of-pocket maximum of €300 
per year per person insured(Techniker Krankenkasse 2003) 
Optional contracts between individual patients and sickness fund 
Ambulatory physician care  Coverage exclusions  A specified number of medical services called ‘individual health services’ (IGeL) may be offered 
by SHI-contracted ambulatory care physicians, which are not covered by SHI. They consist in 
services not considered to be medically necessary by the SHI. Examples include  annual 
comprehensive ‘health check-ups’, travel vaccinations, alternative and complementary 
medicine, and refractive corneal surgery to treat myopia. 
Optional contracts between patients and physicians 
17 2.5.   Protection  mechanisms 
 
 
Exemption from user charges in Germany is either granted for patients of specific population 
sub-groups or for reasons of equity.  
 
Population sub-groups which are in principle exempt from user charges are: 
 
  Children and adolescents up to the age of 18 years. The exemption does not apply to 
crowns and dentures, transportation costs, and to orthodontic treatment. For orthodontic 
treatment the law specifies a reduction of the co-insurance of 20% to 10% in households 
with more than one child in need of orthodontic care. The reduced rate only applies to 
subsequent children (§ 29 SGB V). 
  Women with pregnancy-related complaints (§ 36b BSG). 
 
  Patients eligible for exemption for reasons of equity fall into three sub-groups: 
 
  General exemption from user charges is granted to all insurees receiving state benefits 
(income support, war-victim benefits, unemployment support, student grants under the 
statutory grant scheme) or to insurees on low incomes4. The exemption does not apply to 
price differentials for reference-priced pharmaceuticals or co-payments for hospital 
treatment (Sozialklausel §61 SGB V). 
 
  Partial exemption is granted if the cumulative user charges for pharmaceuticals, dressings, 
non-physician care and travel costs exceed 2% of the patient’s household gross annual 
income5. The patient is then entitled to a reimbursement by the sickness fund of all excess 
user charges occurred during that year (2% regulation, Überforderungsklausel § 62 SGB 
V) (Verband der Angestellten-Krankenkassen (VdAK) & Arbeiter-Ersatzkassen-Verband 
(AEV) 2003b). 
 
  For patients with chronic diseases, i.e. of at least one year duration, the threshold is 
reduced to 1% of gross annual income and exemption from further user charges is granted 
                                                       
4 defined as income per month up to €952/one person, €1309/two persons dependent on the insured person’s income, and 
€238 for each additional dependent. 
5 If more than one person is dependent on this income, the threshold is lowered by €4284 for the second person, and by €2856 
for each additional dependent. 
18 for as long as the disease persists. In contrast to the 2% regulation, this exemption only 
applies to the respective person individually and does not include user charges incurred by 
dependents (1% regulation, Überforderungsklausel §62 SGB V). 
 
In 2001, 47% of prescriptions were exempted from co-payments (Nink & Schröder 2003). 
Exemptions on the basis of the legislation to avoid undue financial burdens 
(Überforderungsklausel) have risen by factor 5 between 1997 and 2000 from around 330.000 
to 1.82 million insured persons (Nink & Schröder 2003). All exemption mechanisms taken 
together, more than one third of the SHI-insured population is now exempt from co-payments 
for pharmaceuticals (Nink & Schröder 2003). Between 1993 and 1998, the proportion of SHI-
insured population completely exempted from user charges (Sozialklausel) increased from 
10.2% to 13.7% (excluding children). The number partially exempted from user charges 
(Überforderungsklausel) increased from 0.2% to 0.6% in the same time (Eller, Baumann, & 
Mielck 2002). If private expenditure on health care, e.g. out-of-pocket payments for 
supplementary private medical care, exceed a threshold of € 600 per year and exceed a certain 
percentage of the annual household income, income tax relief is granted for the costs above 
the threshold.  
 
Complementary VHI in Germany is not usually taken out to protect against co-payments and 
co-insurance as e.g. in France, but is rather seen as a luxury choice for SHI-insured persons to 
get the benefits of private medical care. Recently however, a small number of private health 
insurance companies started to offer special insurance packages to cover SHI co-payments. 
Data on actual sales of these insurance packages are not available.  
 
 
2.6.     Responsibility for decision-making on cost-sharing measures 
 
 
Decisions on cost-sharing methods and initial levels are made through the national 
parliamentary process. Usually, the federal government under the leadership of the Minister 
of Health and Social Security develops a proposal for a change in legislation, which is 
formally presented to parliament, which decides on the adaptation in a majority vote. The 
change in legislation has then to be approved by the Federal Council, representing the 
Bundesländer. Some laws grant power to the Federal Minister of Health to extend the new 
legislation by decrees, which do not require renewed parliamentary approval. For instance the 
19 Health Care Reform Act of 1989 empowered the Minister of Health to extend the negative list 
for pharmaceuticals by decree (§ 34 SGB V). 
 
The SHI benefits catalogue is only defined in broad terms in federal legislation (§§ 2,12 SGB 
V) and decisions on which benefits to exclude are left to the self-administration of sickness 
funds and physicians associations at federal level in form of a joint committee – the Federal 
Committee of Physicians and Sickness Funds.  
 
The decision process for reference prices for pharmaceuticals has two steps. In the first step, 
the Federal Committee of Physicians and Sickness Funds decides which groups of 
pharmaceuticals will be included in the reference-price scheme. Experts from academia, 
physicians’ organisations or pharmaceutical industry have a right to be heard by the 
Committee. The second step is the fixing of price ceilings, which is done by a committee of 
high-level representatives of all sickness funds at federal level (Spitzenverbände der 
Krankenkassen). The reference price scheme for sensory and orthopaedic aids differs from the 
scheme for pharmaceuticals. Groups of aids subject to reference-pricing are decided by the 
high-level representatives of all sickness funds at federal level and price ceilings are fixed in a 
second step at Bundesland level by committees representing the regional sickness funds. This 
leads to regional variation in reference prices for aids, except for the two most important 
categories of hearing aids and eyeglasses which are uniform throughout the country. 
Individual sickness funds thus have no decision making power in setting user charges. 
Voluntary health insurers on the contrary have considerable discretion in defining cost-
sharing arrangements in insurance policies offered, resulting in a very intransparent market 
with myriads of different benefit packages at different premiums to choose from. 
 
Physicians are explicitly prohibited to raise user charges other than those foreseen by law, i.e. 
for massages, medicinal baths or physiotherapy provided in a physician’s office (§ 18 BMV-
Ä, § 21 EKV-Ä). The legal case of a physician who lost her SHI contract because she offered 
homeopathic treatment to SHI patients on a private co-payment basis has been published 
(Gollrad 2003). The provision of benefits not covered by SHI to SHI-insured patients, so-
called individual health services (individuelle Gesundheitsleistungen – IgEL) is tightly 
regulated by the regional physicians’ associations and billing has to be conform to the 
regulations for VHI-insured patients, which include a written contract between the patient and 
physician before treatment and a nationwide uniform fee-schedule (Kassenärztliche 
Vereinigung Niedersachsen 2003).   
20 3. The impact of cost sharing on equity, efficiency and health 
outcomes: a review of the literature 
 
 
There is little clear-cut evidence for the long term effect of user charges in Germany. This is 
caused by various reasons: 
 
  User charges remain marginal in many areas. 
 
  Legislation on user charges changes quickly, making changes in demand difficult to 
attribute. For example in the case of psychotherapy, legislation on user charges was 
amended by a successive law but then abolished altogether by a third law before the 
original legislation was coming into force. 
 
  The problem of confounding with other regulatory interventions does not allow to clearly 
attribute effects to changes in user charges. For example the more than 100% rise in user 
charges for inpatient preventive spa treatment in 1997 was accompanied by legislation 
reducing the length of treatment episodes and extending the time between two treatment 
episodes before patients were eligible to the service again (Schwartz & Wismar 1998). 
 
In contrast, short term effects of changes in user charge legislation have been sometimes 
rather dramatic. A well known example is the notorious „Blüm-belly-effect“6. In 1988 a rise 
in user charges for dentures was announced for the following year. Patients hurried to get 
their teeth fixed before the new legislation came into force. This resulted in an increased SHI 
expenditure for 1988 and a subsequent drop in the following year – making the reform look 
successful (Wismar 1996). 
 
In 1998 the expenditure for dentures collapsed by –30.6% for Germany (-28.8% old Länder, -
39.6% new Länder) compared with the previous year. This was caused not only by 
introducing extra billing. The dentists’ associations had been at loggerheads with the Ministry 
over the question of who pays for the treatment plan and various other issues, creating an 
atmosphere of uncertainty. Patients consequently refrained from consulting a dentist. In 1999, 
expenditure for dentures increased again by 9.2% (8.5% old Länder, 13.2% new Länder)7. 
This also demonstrated that demand was more price elastic in the new Länder, which might 
                                                       
6 an expenditure curve which resembles the physical appearance of a former Minister in charge of the SHI, Norbert Blüm. 
7 Own calculations based on expenditure data 1976-2001 provided by the Federal Association of Dentists (Kassenzahnärztliche 
Bundesvereinigung (KZBV) 2003). 
21 reflect the difference in income structure between the two parts of the country, which is 
particularly pronounced in older age groups. The results of a systematic literature review on 
cost-sharing arrangements in Germany are summarised in Table 5.  
 
 
3.1.     Impact on efficiency 
 
 
The reference price scheme for pharmaceuticals proved to be an effective measure for cost-
containment. Because of the patient’s intention to circumvene co-payment, demand for 
pharmaceuticals below the reference price ceiling has increased. This, in turn, has led to an 
increased competition among the pharmaceutical industry. As a consequence the sickness 
funds were able to make substantial savings in the reference price segments of prescribed 
drugs, without raising co-payment for patients (Statistisches Bundesamt 1998a). The annual 
savings for sickness funds from the reference-price scheme gradually increased from € 1.2 
billion in 1996 to €2.1 billion in 2002 (Verband Forschender Arzneimittelhersteller e.V. 
2002). 
 
But user charges do not necessarily increase efficiency. In some cases they may contribute to 
rising costs and inefficiencies. The exclusion of trivial pharmaceuticals from SHI coverage in 
1983 which resulted in a user charge of 100% did not lead to a reduction in SHI expenditure. 
Instead there is evidence that these pharmaceuticals were substituted by more effective but 
also more expensive pharmaceuticals. Neither a decrease in prescriptions nor an increase in 
the consumption of cheaper pharmaceuticals was observed (Reichelt 1994b). 
 
From an administrative point of view it has been argued that some forms of user charge may 
not generate the expected revenue. Deductibles will incur high administrative costs for the 
sickness funds (Sing 1997). Exemption schemes are expensive to administer in general and 
how much of the additional revenues raised through user charges is spent on administration to 
run the schemes is largely unknown. This particularly applies to the complicated system of 
exemption regulation in Germany. However, data on how much administrative costs are 
caused by the German schemes are not available.  
22 Table 5. Review on the literature on cost sharing in Germany. 
 
Author + date  Study 
period 
Study population + data 
source 
Outcomes    Price  variation Type of study / design  Results 
von der Schulenburg 
1987 (Graf von der 
Schulenburg 1987) 
  76 private health insurance 
contracts 
     Observational
 
Price elasticity of demand between -0.078 to 
0.389 
Von der Schulenburg 
and Uber 1993 (Graf 
von der Schulenburg & 
Uber 1993) 
  Ambulatory patients  Demand for 
phlebotropic 
drugs  
Higher co-payments  Willingness-to-pay study 
Survey 
Low percentage of patients show price 
responsiveness: 5% would stop buying 
phlebotropic drugs, 22% would reduce 
consumption if they had to pay cost themselves 
Reichelt 1994 (Reichelt 
1994b) 
    SHI  insurance Pharmaceutical
spending 
  Exclusion of pharmaceuticals 
through negative list 
Observational  Substitution of pharmaceuticals excluded from 
SHI reimbursement by more effective and more 














  Planned increase in co-
payments for 
pharmaceuticals 
Survey  70% of interviewees indicated that they would 
not consult their ambulatory care physician to 
get a prescription for OTC available drugs in 
case of higher co-payments 
Lauterbach et al 2000 
(Lauterbach, Gandjour, 
& Schnell 2000) 
Oct-Dec 
1998 
Users of pharmacies aged over 
18 and not-exempted from user 
charges, 10,000 
questionnaires, 695 responses 
Reported change 
in behaviour after 
increases in user 
charges in July 
1997 
Higher co-payments (+90%)  Survey 
Questionnaire 
4.5% reduction in ambulatory medical care 
utilisation; 0.06% reduction in pharmaceutical 
consumption. 
Demand in chronically ill was less elastic. 
Demand in low income group was more elastic 
(no statistical analysis for subgroups because of 
small numbers) 
Eller et al 2002 (Eller, 




18,238 persons insured with 
one regional sickness fund 
(AOK Augsburg),  6244 





- Application for 
exemption 
Not applicable  Survey 
Questionnaire and telephone 
interviews in random sample 
62% of SHI insurees are not aware of partial 
exemption regulation, 28% are not aware of 
general exemption regulation. Proportions are in 
similar range for eligible population sub-groups. 
In those aware of regulation, the main reason 
for not applying for exemption is lack of 
knowledge about income ceilings to determine 
eligibility.  






1889 responding patients in 9 
GP practices in Hesse, number 





Introduction of drug budget 
and higher copayments 
starting at start of survey 
(+90% to +200% depending 
on package size) 
Survey 
Questionnaire 
No significant impact of policy changes on user 















Reference-price scheme  Observational  Cost-savings for SHI from pharmaceuticals 
reference-price scheme (billion €): 
1996 (1.2), 1997 (1.4), 1998 (1.6), 1999 (1.7), 
2000 (1.7), 2001 (1.8), 2002 (2.1) 
23 3.2.    Impact on equity 
 
There is evidence that in Germany expenditure for co-payments for pharmaceuticals grow 
with age (Table 6). Assuming that elderly people are more in need and that pensions are 
substantially lower than income, user charges introduce a risk-related financial burden which 
is incompatible with solidarity in SHI. However, many elderly people are exempt from co-
payments for social reasons (2% regulation, Überforderungsklausel § 62 SGB V).  
 
 
Table 6: Co-payments for pharmaceuticals grow with age, 1996-2002. 
 
Age  (years)  <20 21-40  41-60  >60  
  male female  male  female  male  female  male female  average 
1996 (€)  1.3  1.7  7.7  12.1  19.2  28.2  52.7  58.3  22.7 
1997 (€)  1.7  1.4  11.3  17.7  27.8  39.7  75.9  80.8  31.8 
2002  (€)  0.45 1.11  10.5  16.8 24.3  34.0 50.4 55.6  24.1 




Equity implications of exemption mechanisms from user charges constitute another problem. 
There is some evidence that many eligible patients do not claim exemption. A recent study 
showed that 28% of surveyed sickness fund members did not know about the general 
exemption mechanism (Sozialklausel) and 62% did not know about the possibility of partial 
exemption (Überforderungsklausel) (Eller, Baumann, & Mielck 2002). These rates were not 
markedly different in those with potential eligibility for exemption based on questionnaire 
data. Although this study only covered a population of about 18,000 people insured with one 
particular regional sickness fund, it can be assumed that many insured who are eligible for 
exemption do not claim reimbursement of user charges. Most of the patients who were aware 
of the possibility of exemption and eligible but did not apply stated that they thought their 
income was too high (Eller, Baumann, & Mielck 2002). This is an effect of a lack in flow of 




3.3.     Evidence of administrative and other effects 
 
Higher levels of co-payments for pharmaceuticals since July 1997 resulted in 20% of all 
prescriptions and 4% of pharmaceutical sales volume in the SHI market being below the co-
payment ceiling – which in effect constitutes a 100% co-payment. Although prescriptions are 
legal documents owned by the sickness funds, it has been argued that pharmacists do not pass 
these prescriptions on to the pharmacy-computing service as they have already perceived the 
total amount due in the form of the co-payment. As a consequence, these prescriptions are not 
taken into account in the statistics. This results in a distortion of the overall statistics of SHI 
expenditure and limits the possibility of efficiency benchmarking (Schwabe 1997) 
 
 
4. Political feasibility: a discussion of policy debates concerning 
cost sharing 
 
Although user charges have played a minor role in the German SHI in terms of generating 
revenue, they have always been a major issue of political controversy.  
 
Since the creation of the Federal Republic two health care reform proposals failed in 1960 and 
in 1964. Both of them contained provisions for user charges which exceeded by far the extent 
of user charges introduced during the cost-containment period (Bandelow 1998). In 1960 a 
co-payment of DM 1.50 was planned for each item on the medical fee schedule delivered by 
physicians in the ambulatory sector. The co-payment would have been limited to 6 weeks for 
every disease episode. At the same time a differentiated co-payment for pharmaceuticals up to 
DM 3 per prescription was suggested. Highly relevant was the co-insurance for hospital-, 
preventive spa treatment and rehabilitation of 0.5% of the monthly income up to DM 3.30 per 
day (in 1960 the assessable income limit was DM 630). The second reform proposal in 1964 
planned user charges of a total of 25% of all outpatient medical and dental services (Müller 
1980). Both reforms failed in the political process. While the physician associations 
welcomed user charges as a further source of revenue, they opposed other parts of the reform. 
The trade unions and the Social Democratic Party (SPD) forcefully opposed the reform 
proposal on the grounds that it implied general moral hazard by patients. The minister in 
charge could not rely on the support of his own party - large parts of the governing Christian 
25 Democratic Party (CDU), in particular the committees for social affairs, opposed the 
proposals. Only the employers’ association and the association of private health insurers were 
in favour of the proposal (Müller 1980). Due to a coming general election, Chancellor 
Adenauer intervened into health policy and withdrew his support for the reform proposal. The 
failed reform attempts led to the resignation of the Minister of Health in charge and in turn 
constituted a reform-trauma which contributed to the myth of the reform resistance of the 
SHI. 
 
As a prelude to the era of cost-containment, the political debate was dominated by the issue of 
the so-called „cost-explosion“. Expenditure had, intentionally, risen rapidly until the mid 70s. 
In 1977 the first explicit cost-containment law was introduced extending user charges 
substantially. But user charges remained an awkward political issue under the SPD/Free 
Democratic Party (FDP) government. The SPD could not convincingly reconcile user charges 
with social justice and equity which was very important for the party’s identity. Expectations 
of their traditional blue collar electorate were disappointed. For the successive CDU/FDP 
coalition government – which took over in 1982 - user charges fitted better into the party 
programme. Since the major criticism of the welfare state by the CDU was an alleged 
imbalance between individual rights and solidarity, the concept of subsidiarity became a 
guiding principle. Originating from catholic social theory, subsidiarity conceptualises the 
relation between the individual and the state. The state is conceived of as a supporter in the 
last instance (Wismar 1996). Only if the individual is unable to take care of himself and his 
family, friends, neighbourhoods or the church or trade unions fail to give support, the state 
steps in (Biedenkopf 1985;Blüm 1983;Späth 1985). Although it is debatable whether this 
approach has much in common with social reality in Germany, it remained the main focus of 
political debate on the welfare state and health policy. User charges were conceived of as the 
perfect instrument in this respect. But bearing in mind the experiences of the failed reform 
attempts in the 1960s the government was eager not to increase the amount of user charges 
excessively. Furthermore there was little need to extend user charges because until 
reunification the share of SHI expenditure as a percentage of GDP and contribution rates 
remained fairly stable. 
 
After two major healthcare reforms which came into force in 1989 and 1994 there was again a 
growing awareness of the need to generally overhaul the whole system. An unprecedented 
reform debate on the roll-back of social insurance in health care and the privatisation of health 
26 care took place (Stegmüller 1996). Although no drastic measures were taken, the political 
debate shifted. SHI was considered not only a burden in terms of expenditure but at the same 
time as an industry and potential job market of the future (Sachverständigenrat für die 
Konzertierte Aktion im Gesundheitswesen 1996;Sachverständigenrat für die Konzertierte 
Aktion im Gesundheitswesen 1998). In order not to strangle this industry by strict cost-
containment policies the new strategy of the government was to channel more money into the 
system without raising the employers’ contribution. The major instrument of this policy was 
to expand user charges drastically (Busse & Wismar 1997). Today, this move in health policy 
is conceived of as having substantially contributed to the defeat of the CDU/FDP coalition 
government in the general elections of 1998. In the federal election campaigns of 1998 user 
charges – especially with regard to dentures - became an important political issue. After a 
clear-cut victory, the newly elected SPD/Greens coalition government set immediately pace to 
introduce legislation reducing the level of user charges and lowering the thresholds for 
exemption. 
 
Over the decades provider attitudes towards user charges have remained rather stable. A 
survey among 4,500 German physicians in November 1996 showed that the majority of 
doctors are still in favour of user charges. Asked whether the current level of user charges was 
reasonable, 90% responded positively. 67% were in favour of an increase in user charges 
while 31% were against an increase (Beske, Hallauer, & Kern 1997). 
 
 
5. Plans for the development of cost-sharing arrangements  
 
 
In a speech to parliament, Chancellor Gerhard Schröder has stated in March 2003 that the 
reform of the SHI is the most important aspect of political renewal in Germany 
(Bundesregierung 2003). He explicitly announced cuts in benefits and a raise in user charges 
in order to sustain a system of high-quality health care which is accessible for everyone, 
independent of age or income. 
 
To avoid blocking of this health care reform by the Federal Council8 the SPD/Greens 
coalition government has elaborated the new legislation together with the opposition parties 
and representatives of the Bundesländer. This is an exceptional procedure and only happened 
                                                       
8 The opposition parties have the majority in the Federal Council. 
27 once before in 1992, at the time with inverted roles for government and opposition. The 
ensuing Health Care Structure Act of 1993 was considered a political success as it cooled 
down the health policy debate for three years (Becker 2003), although it was not successful in 
stabilising SHI expenditure. The final bill from 8 September 2003 for the Statutory Health 
Insurance Modernisation Act (Deutscher Bundestag 2003) thus contains a mixture of red-
green and conservative political demands. This partly explains the increase in cost-sharing 
and other more pro-market reform orientated measures, e.g. legalising pharmaceutical sales 
by internet pharmacies, compared to health policy decisions so far made by the ruling 
government.  
 
The stated objectives of the reform are to improve efficiency and quality of health care, in 
particular for frequent chronic diseases, and to stabilise SHI contribution rates in order to 
avoid disincentives for employers to invest in job-creating activities without rationing services 
(Deutscher Bundestag 2003).  
 
The changes in cost-sharing arrangements anticipated to come into force on 1 January 2004 
are detailed in Table 2. Based on Federal Ministry of Health calculations these will result in 
substantial cost-savings for SHI rising from € 9.8 billion in 2004 to € 23 billion in 2007 
(Deutscher Bundestag 2003). The € 23 billion savings in 2007 are mainly achieved through 
cost-shifting from employers (€ 11.5 billion) and healthy employees (€ 3 billion) to patients, 
pensioners, smokers, and to a lesser extent to providers and industry (figure 1).  
 
The anticipated changes in financing affecting users and insurees are composed of the 
following measures (Deutscher Bundestag 2003): 
  exclusion of benefits (€ 2.5 billion9);  
  higher co-payments (€ 3.2 billion);  
  a separate insurance for dentures (€ 3.5 billion) which will be regressive because a flat 
premium will applied; 
  financing of some benefits which are not considered to be core SHI benefits through 
increases in tobacco taxes rising from € 1 billion in 2004 to € 4.2 billion in 2007; 
  extension of SHI contributions to income from additional, non-statutory pensions which 
have been hitherto exempted raising € 1.6 billion in revenues for SHI; 
                                                       
9 Savings from exclusion of benefits in cash and kind are further broken down. The major savings accrue from exclusion of OTC 
medication from reimbursement (€ 1 billion), exclusion of ambulatory travel costs (€ 0.5 billion), and cash benefits to families in 
case of death (€ 0,4 billion) (Deutscher Bundestag 2003). 
28   a “special” contribution (Sonderbeitrag) by all SHI insurees (but not by employers) raising 
€ 5 billion per year.  
 
This reform will end the parity in SHI contributions by employers and employees which was 
established in 1949 (Alber 1992) and is still in place in 2003. If the law comes into force as 
planned, employees will contribute 53.3% and employers 46.7% to formal SHI in 2007 
(Retzlaff 2003). If the new obligatory insurance for dentures which is no longer part of the 
SHI is taken into account, the distribution is even more unequal with 53.7% contribution by 
employees compared to 46.3% by employers (Fig. 1).  
 
The general exemption regulation currently in force (§ 61 SGB V) is completely abolished10. 
The exemption of children and adolescents under age 18 remains in place. Partial exemption – 
now called ceiling on financial burden (Belastungsobergrenze) - as defined in § 62 SGB V 
now generally applies (Deutscher Bundestag 2003).  
 
In comparison, the anticipated cost-savings from measures targeting health care providers and 
pharmaceutical industry are minimal, totalling € 1.5 billion in 2004 rising progressively to € 3 
billion in 2007. This imbalance is even more pronounced if one considers that users of health 
services, insurees and citizens have little possibility to reduce utilisation or avoid paying taxes 
or SHI contributions whereas experience in Germany and other countries has shown that 
providers and industry are often able to compensate for financial cuts by raising additional 
revenue through other channels. A notorious example in Germany was the rise in private 
health insurance expenditure in areas where SHI cost-containment measures was most 
successful, e.g. for dental care and pharmaceuticals (Busse 2000). In contrast to current 
legislation, prices for OTC drugs which are not reimbursable by sickness funds will no longer 
fall under price regulation (Deutscher Bundestag 2003), i.e. pricing for OTC drugs will be left 
to free market competition. Whether this will lead to an increase or decrease of aggregate 
consumer expenditure for OTC drugs remains to be seen. As the current regulation’s aim is 
cost-containment and the pharmacists’ monopoly to sell drugs will remain largely unaltered, 
an increase in prices and higher costs for patients are the more likely scenario.  
 
                                                       
10 Interestingly the former § 61 SGB V regulating the exemption of the most deprived groups in the population now details the 






SHI  Users 
 
 
Figure 1. Anticipated cost-shifting from employers and healthy employees to users of 
health care, smokers, pensioners, providers and industry, and the de facto end of 
contribution parity in SHI. Source: Own calculations based on SHI health care spending in 
2002 (Bundesministerium für Gesundheit und Soziale Sicherung 2003) and data from the 
original proposals for the Statutory Health Insurance Modernisation Act 2003 (Deutscher 






The public is not unaware of these developments. In a recent survey 64% of users thought the 
new reform proposals were unfair and represented a major cost-shifting to patients and 
insurees. Only 28% of users declared that they would plan their utilisation of medical care 
more carefully because of the new co-payment for outpatient consultations (Anonymous 
2003). This can be interpreted as yet another indicator that user charges are not an efficient 
means to steer utilisation behaviour, an often repeated claim also made by the Chancellor to 
justify the current proposals for a change in legislation (Bundesregierung 2003). In reality, in 
Germany user charges primarily serve to raise additional revenue without getting into conflict 
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